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On 1 October 2026, Connecticut switched on a law that tells you exactly what sentence to print next to a price your software personalized. It also, two paragraphs later, tells retail sellers they may not personalize that price at all.
Both of those are in the same section of the same act. They use different defined terms, they catch different businesses, and only one of them applies to prices shown offline. If you sell eyewear online and you ship to Connecticut, the practical result is unusual: the statute hands you a warning label that, in most of the situations where you would reach for it, you are not permitted to be in.
This is not the Connecticut Data Privacy Act being amended. It is a brand new section, and it carries none of the privacy act’s size thresholds. That is the part almost nobody has written about.
What actually took effect on 1 October
The instrument is Connecticut Public Act No. 26-64, which began life as Substitute Senate Bill No. 4. The pricing rules are in Section 11, and the act prints its own commencement under the section heading:
“Sec. 11. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2026) (a) As used in this section:”
(NEW) is the drafting convention that tells you this is not an amendment to anything. Section 11 is a free-standing addition to Connecticut’s statute book, which is why reading commentary about how the state’s privacy law changed will not tell you what it does.
The July 2027 date you may have read belongs to a different section
If you went looking for this before today, you probably met two conflicting dates. Some write-ups put the pricing rules in force on 1 October 2026; at least one put them at 1 July 2027. We went to the enrolled act to settle it.
The act has twenty sections, and every one of them is effective 1 October 2026. There is no general commencement clause at the end; each section prints its own date, and they all say the same thing.
The 1 July 2027 date is real, but it belongs to Section 20, which is about the loudness of commercial advertisements on streaming video services. Its subsection (b) sets a 1 July 2027 start for the loudness requirement. It has nothing to do with pricing, retailers or personal data.
This is a trap we have walked into before on this blog, from the other direction: a headline deadline that turned out to belong to somebody else entirely. If a summary of a multi-topic act gives you a date, check which section the date is attached to before you diary it.
Two duties, and they are not the same duty
Section 11 does two separate things.
Subsection (b) is a disclosure duty. It opens:
“Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, any person doing business in the state who uses a price setting device”
A person who does that has to carry a specific sentence, or one substantially similar to it, with the price. The act writes the sentence for you, in capitals:
“THIS PRICE WAS INCREASED BY A PRICE SETTING DEVICE USING YOUR PERSONAL DATA”
Subsection (b)(1) lists where it has to appear — in any “online advertisement, promotion, label, statement, display, image, offer or announcement” showing such a price. Subsection (b)(2) requires it to be readily visible to the average consumer. Note the first word of that list: subsection (b) is an online-only duty. A price on a shelf edge in a Hartford storefront is outside it.
Subsection (c) is a prohibition. It opens:
“Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, no retail seller or third-party delivery service”
— and goes on to bar them from engaging in surveillance pricing, subject to a list of exceptions we come to below. Subsection (c) is not limited to online. It catches a narrower set of businesses and a narrower kind of conduct, but across every channel.
So the shape of the thing is: a wide, online-only, label-it-and-you-may-proceed rule, sitting on top of a narrower, all-channel, you-may-not rule. An online eyewear store that meets the definition below is inside both.
Are you a “retail seller”? The answer is in the sales tax code
This is the scope question, and the drafting is worth knowing about. Section 11(a) defines a retail seller by importing a definition from somewhere else entirely:
“Retail seller” (A) means a retailer, as defined in section 12-407 of the general statutes,
Section 12-407 is the sales and use tax definitions section. Its definition of retailer includes, at subdivision (12)(G), “Every person making retail sales of tangible personal property or services from outside this state” into Connecticut, where the seller meets an economic threshold — gross receipts of at least $100,000 and 200 or more retail sales into the state, measured over the twelve-month period ending on the 30 September before the period in question. The same two figures appear in the statute’s “engaged in business in the state” test. The Section 11 definition also sweeps in retail food establishments, which will not detain anyone selling glasses.
What that means in practice, and we flag this as our reading rather than something the act says: if your store is already over Connecticut’s remote-seller line for sales tax purposes, you are very likely a retail seller for Section 11 too, because Section 11 is pointing at the same test. The register you are already on is the best proxy you have. It is not a perfect one — a business can be registered for reasons other than meeting that test — so treat it as a strong indicator, not a determination.
Note also the axis. The threshold counts sales into Connecticut, not where you are established. A store in Portland or Porto with enough Connecticut customers is in scope; a store physically in New Haven with almost no sales is, on the face of the threshold, potentially out of it.
There is no size threshold, and that is the headline
Connecticut’s data privacy act famously applies only above certain volumes of consumers processed. Readers who know that will assume the same gate sits in front of these pricing rules.
It does not. Section 11 contains no revenue threshold, no employee-count threshold and no number-of-consumers threshold. We checked every subsection — the definitions in (a), the duties in (b) and (c), the exemptions in (d) and the enforcement provision in (e). The only carve-outs in subsection (d) are sectoral, not size-based: persons regulated under the insurance code, financial institutions subject to Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and certain banks and holding companies overseen by the Banking Commissioner.
Eyewear retail is in none of those categories. A two-person Shopify store that clears the remote-seller threshold is as covered as a national chain.
The two tests are not the same test, and the gap matters
Subsection (b) turns on a price setting device. Subsection (c) turns on surveillance pricing. They are defined separately and they do not line up.
A price setting device is, in the act’s words, “any automated or programmed process that uses a consumer’s personal data to establish a price”. Read that twice. It does not say artificial intelligence. It does not say machine learning, or model, or algorithm. Any automated or programmed process is wide enough to include a plain conditional rule in an app — if this shopper did X, show price Y.
Surveillance pricing is defined more tightly. It “means the practice of establishing a customized price for a consumer good or consumer service that is specific to a consumer based, in whole or in part, on the consumer’s personal data collected (A) through any technology or technological method, system or tool, including, but not limited to, any biometric monitoring, camera, device tracking or sensor, that is capable of gathering personal data” about the consumer’s behavior, characteristics, location or other attributes, in a physical or digital setting, and (B) by the person setting the price, either directly or indirectly through a third party.
Two things to take from that. First, limbs (A) and (B) are joined by and, not or — both have to be satisfied. Surveillance pricing therefore carries a collection element that the price setting device definition does not have at all. Second, limb (A) expressly names device tracking, which in an e-commerce context is not an exotic technology. It is the ordinary apparatus of an online store.
The gap runs both ways. A retail seller could in principle use a price setting device in a way that falls outside the collection limbs, in which case the label duty bites and the prohibition does not. And personalized pricing done by hand from a customer dossier, with no automated process anywhere, could breach the prohibition while never triggering the label duty, because nothing automated set the price.
For the ordinary online eyewear store, though, the honest summary is that if you are personalizing prices from shopper data gathered by your own site and apps, you are likely to be inside both — and the one that matters is the one that says no.
What you can still do: the exceptions, including one with a trap in it
Subsection (c)(2) carries exceptions, and they are the most practically useful part of the section. Three matter here.
The retention exception, (c)(2)(A). It begins:
“Establishing for, or offering to, a consumer a discounted price for a consumer service for the purpose of retaining”
— the consumer as a customer. No time limit, no dollar cap. This is the exception that covers a win-back or stay-with-us discount.
And here is the trap: it says consumer service, not consumer good. The parallel exception two subparagraphs later says “consumer good or consumer service”, so the narrower wording in (A) is doing deliberate work. A frame, a lens, a bottle of solution and a box of contact lenses are goods. On the face of the text, a personalized retention discount calculated from a shopper’s behavior and offered on goods does not sit in this exception. Whether a contact lens replenishment plan is a service for this purpose, when the thing being delivered is a good, is a real question and we are not going to pretend the act answers it.
This is the single most commonly deployed piece of software on a Shopify store — the cart-abandonment or win-back engine that decides how much to offer this particular shopper. If it is sizing the offer from that shopper’s own data, the retention exception may not reach it.
The cost and timing exception, (c)(2)(B), permits price differences that reflect genuine differences in cost or timing. Charging more to ship to a remote address because it genuinely costs more is not surveillance pricing.
The posted-terms exception, (c)(2)(C), is the one to build on. It begins:
“(C) Establishing for, or offering to, a consumer or group of consumers a discounted price for a consumer good or consumer”
— service, on terms anyone can meet. It covers discounts available to anyone who satisfies published conditions, such as joining a mailing list or signing up for promotions; discounts for broad defined groups such as veterans, seniors, students, teachers or residents of an area; and loyalty programs that customers have to actively join. The conditions are that the discounted price and its terms are prominently posted on the seller’s website in plain language, and that the discount is offered to everyone who meets those posted conditions.
That is a workable description of an ordinary, honest promotions program, and it is the route out. The distinction the act is drawing is between a price you publish and anyone can qualify for and a price computed for one shopper from what you know about them. The first is a discount. The second is what Section 11 is aimed at.
New York asks you to confess. Connecticut tells retail sellers not to do it.
New York already has a provision on exactly this subject: General Business Law § 349-a, headed simply “Pricing”. It too prescribes a sentence, and the resemblance is striking:
New York: “THIS PRICE WAS SET BY AN ALGORITHM USING YOUR PERSONAL DATA”
Connecticut: “THIS PRICE WAS INCREASED BY A PRICE SETTING DEVICE USING YOUR PERSONAL DATA”
Two legislatures, two near-identical sentences — and two different words doing the work. New York’s label is neutral about direction: the algorithm set the price, and it might have set it lower. Connecticut’s label is an admission that the price went up.
The deeper difference is structural. New York § 349-a requires the disclosure and stops there. It does not prohibit personalized algorithmic pricing. Display the sentence clearly and conspicuously with the price and you have complied. Enforcement is by the Attorney General, who must first send a cease and desist letter; if the conduct continues past the cure period the AG can seek an injunction and a court may impose a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per violation. There is no private right of action.
Connecticut does both. It prescribes a label in subsection (b) and then, in subsection (c), tells retail sellers not to engage in the conduct. For a retail seller, the label is therefore not a compliance route in the way New York’s is. In New York, printing the sentence is how you stay lawful. In Connecticut, if you are a retail seller, finding yourself in a position where that sentence is accurate is a strong signal that you have a subsection (c) problem — and printing it does not cure that. The disclosure one subsection demands is, for the businesses the next subsection covers, closer to evidence.
We want to be careful here, because the two subsections key off different definitions and the overlap is not total. The precise statement is this: subsection (b) is satisfied by labelling; subsection (c) is not satisfiable by labelling at all. A retail seller has to clear both, and the second one has no label-shaped exit.
The federal half of this is still a proposal
The Federal Trade Commission has a proposed enforcement policy statement on personalized pricing out under docket FTC-2026-1057. The comment period was extended and then closed: the Commission’s own announcement, dated 3 September 2026, says “The new deadline to submit comments is Sept. 25, 2026.”
Two things follow. It is a proposal, not a rule and not a final policy statement, and it imposes no duty on anybody today. And the comment window shut a fortnight ago, which means a final statement could issue at any point without further warning. If you are building a pricing posture this quarter, build it against Connecticut and New York, which are law, and treat the federal position as a thing that may land on top.
Who can actually come after you
Section 11(e) answers this. It begins:
“Any violation of the provisions of subsections (b) to (d), inclusive, of this section shall constitute an unfair or”
— deceptive trade practice under section 42-110b of the general statutes, which is the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. Critically, the subsection goes on to state that enforcement is by the Attorney General only, and that it creates no private right of action and no grounds for a claim under CUTPA’s private-action provision.
That is an unusually explicit closing of the door, and it is worth noticing why it had to be explicit. Routing a breach into a general unfair-trade-practices statute would normally hand claimants whatever remedies that statute already provides. Connecticut has deliberately imported the classification without the claimants. Readers who followed our piece on the FTC’s complaint against a contact lens retailer will recognize the pattern: whether a breach of a specific duty opens the door to a general consumer statute is a separate question from whether the duty exists, and legislatures answer it in both directions.
For a merchant, the practical read is that your exposure here is a state Attorney General, not a class action. That lowers the probability and raises the stakes of any single event.
What an eyewear store should do this week
- Find out whether anything you run sets a price from shopper data. Not just a pricing “AI” — the definition catches any automated or programmed process. Cart-abandonment discount engines, dynamic bundling, returning-visitor offers, app-based price tests segmented by behavior, and anything that varies a displayed price by inferred location all deserve a look.
- Separate published offers from computed offers. A discount with posted conditions that anyone can meet is the (c)(2)(C) route. A discount whose size is calculated for one shopper is the thing being regulated. Most stores can convert a lot of the second into the first without losing much.
- Do not rely on the retention exception for goods. It is drafted for a consumer service. If your win-back flow discounts frames or lenses, it needs another basis.
- Post your discount terms properly. Prominent, on your own website, plain language, and honored for everyone who qualifies. That is the text’s own standard and it is cheap to meet.
- Check your Connecticut sales position. If you are over the remote-seller line, assume you are a retail seller for this section.
- If you sell into New York too, remember the two labels are not interchangeable. Different wording, different trigger, and in Connecticut the label does not buy you permission.
- Write down what you checked and when. Nothing in Section 11 rewards a documented process the way some statutes do, but an Attorney General inquiry is a conversation about what you knew.
If your store is also running subscriptions, the pricing and cancellation surfaces now interact: see our notes on the New York City cancellation rule. And because limb (A) of the surveillance pricing definition turns on data collected through tracking technology, the questions it raises overlap with those in our pieces on California’s changes to pen register claims and biometric data in virtual try-on.
What we could not establish
We would rather tell you these than have you assume we checked.
- Whether a device that only ever discounts triggers subsection (b). The prescribed sentence says the price was increased. Whether a tool that only lowers prices has to carry a label asserting an increase is not something the text resolves, and we are not going to guess.
- Whether a contact lens replenishment plan is a “consumer service” for the retention exception when the thing delivered is a good. Unresolved on the face of the act.
- The exact closing words of several provisions. We quoted the enrolled act directly and have marked every quotation above; where a provision continues past our quotation we have said so in our own words rather than extending the quotation marks.
- Whether Connecticut sales tax registration is legally determinative of “retail seller” status. It is a strong indicator because Section 11 imports the same definition. It is our reading, not a rule.
- The currency of the section 12-407 text we read. The threshold figures come from a published copy of the general statutes that is not certified as the current enacted text. The figures are widely reported and consistent, but confirm them against the official code before relying on the exact numbers.
- Whether any Connecticut enforcement has begun. We found none. The section is days old.
Frequently asked questions
Does this apply to my store if I am not based in Connecticut?
Potentially yes. The retail seller definition imports a sales tax concept that reaches out-of-state sellers making retail sales into Connecticut above an economic threshold — reported as $100,000 in gross receipts and 200 or more retail sales over a twelve-month period ending 30 September. The test counts your sales into the state, not where you sit.
Is there a small business exemption?
No. Section 11 has no revenue, headcount or consumer-number threshold anywhere in it. The only exemptions in subsection (d) are for insurance-regulated persons, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Title V financial institutions and certain banks and holding companies.
Can I just add the warning label and carry on?
Not if you are a retail seller. Subsection (b) is discharged by the label. Subsection (c) prohibits the conduct and has no label-based exit — only the exceptions in (c)(2).
Are ordinary sales and coupon codes banned now?
No. A discount published on terms anyone can meet, prominently posted on your website in plain language and honored for everyone who qualifies, is the (c)(2)(C) exception. Broad group discounts such as student, senior, teacher or veteran pricing, and loyalty programs customers actively join, are described in the same exception.
Does the law only catch artificial intelligence?
No, and this is the most commonly misread point. The definition is “any automated or programmed process that uses a consumer’s personal data to establish a price”. A simple conditional rule qualifies.
What is the difference between the New York and Connecticut labels?
New York General Business Law § 349-a requires “THIS PRICE WAS SET BY AN ALGORITHM USING YOUR PERSONAL DATA” and is a disclosure regime only. Connecticut requires “THIS PRICE WAS INCREASED BY A PRICE SETTING DEVICE USING YOUR PERSONAL DATA” and additionally prohibits the practice for retail sellers.
Can a customer sue me under the Connecticut section?
Subsection (e) states that enforcement is by the Attorney General only and that the section creates no private right of action. New York’s § 349-a is also AG-enforced, with a cease and desist letter and cure period first and civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation.
When does the federal rule arrive?
There is no federal rule. The FTC has a proposed enforcement policy statement under docket FTC-2026-1057 whose comment period closed on 25 September 2026. A final statement could issue at any time, but nothing is in force today.
Sources
- Connecticut Public Act No. 26-64 (Substitute Senate Bill No. 4), enrolled act as published by the Connecticut General Assembly — Section 11 read directly, including its effective-date line, the definitions in subsection (a), the duties in subsections (b) and (c), the exceptions in (c)(2), the exemptions in (d) and the enforcement provision in (e); and the effective-date lines of all twenty sections.
- Connecticut General Statutes section 12-407, definition of “retailer” and the “engaged in business in the state” test, including the remote-seller thresholds.
- New York General Business Law § 349-a, “Pricing”, as published by the New York State Senate.
- Federal Trade Commission, announcement extending the public comment period on the proposed policy statement regarding personalized pricing, 3 September 2026, docket FTC-2026-1057.
This article is general information about regulatory developments, not legal advice, and it does not describe VisioncarePro’s own compliance status. Section 11 is new, untested and unlitigated. Take advice on your own pricing stack before you change it.
